The heterogeneous impact of market size on innovation: evidence from French firm-level exports by Aghion, Philippe et al.
The heterogeneous impact of market size on innovation: evidence from 
French firm-level exports
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103434/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Aghion, Philippe, Bergeaud, Antonin, Lequien, Matthieu and Melitz, Marc (2019) 
The heterogeneous impact of market size on innovation: evidence from French 
firm-level exports. CEP Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE,
London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1657 
October 2019 
The Heterogeneous Impact of Market Size on Innovation: 
Evidence from French Firm-Level Exports 
 
Philippe Aghion 
Antonin Bergeaud 
Matthieu Lequien 
Marc Melitz 
 
 
    
Abstract 
We analyze how demand conditions faced by a firm impacts its innovation decisions. To disentangle 
the direction of causality between innovation and demand conditions, we construct a firm-level export 
demand shock which responds to aggregate conditions in a firm’s export destinations but is 
exogenous to firm-level decisions. Using exhaustive data covering the French manufacturing sector, 
we show that French firms respond to exogenous growth shocks in their export destinations by 
patenting more; and that this response is entirely driven by the subset of initially more productive 
firms. The patent response arises 3 to 5 years after a demand shock, highlighting the time required to 
innovate. In contrast, the demand shock raises contemporaneous sales and employment for all firms, 
without any notable differences between high and low productivity firms. We show that this finding 
of a skewed innovation response to common demand shocks arises naturally from a model of 
endogenous innovation and competition with firm heterogeneity. The market size increase drives all 
firms to innovate more by increasing the innovation rents; yet by inducing more entry and thus more 
competition, it also discourages innovation by low productivity firms. 
 
 
Key words: innovation, export, demand shocks, patents 
JEL Codes: D21; F13; F14; F41; O30; O47 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Growth Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title: “The Impact of Export on Innovation: 
Theory and Evidence”. The authors would like to thank, without implicating Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk 
Akcigit, Pol Antras, Kirill Borusyak, Elhanan Helpman, Giammario Impullitti, Thierry Mayer, 
Isabelle Mejean, Torsten Persson, Stephen Redding, Thomas Sampson, Dan Trefler, John Van 
Reenen, Daniel Xu, and participants at the 2017 AEA meeting, the NBER Summer Institute 2017, 
CIFAR and numerous seminars for useful discussions and advises. We are grateful to Connie Lee for 
excellent research assistance. This work is supported by a public grant overseen by the French 
National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the “Investissements d’Avenir” program (reference: 
ANR-10-EQPX-17 - Centre d’accès securisé aux données – CASD.) 
 Philippe Aghion, College de France, London School of Economics and Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. Antonin Bergeaud, Bank of France and Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics. Matthieu Lequien, INSEE and Paris School of 
Economics. Marc Melitz, Harvard University and NBER. 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 P. Aghion, A. Bergeaud, M. Lequien and M. Melitz, submitted 2019. 
1 Introduction
Market size has been shown to be a key driver of innovation and growth, as a larger demand
for a firm’s product increases the firm’s incentives to innovate because it increases the
potential rents from innovation (e.g. see Acemoglu and Linn, 2004, Aghion and Howitt,
2009). But how does market size actually operate? Is it mainly an industry-wide effect
that affects all potential innovators in that industry? Or do firms respond to the specific
demand conditions generated by the buyers of their existing products? And if firms do
respond to increases in demand by innovating more, is this response more concentrated
within certain subset of firms? Also, how long is the lag between the increase in demand
and the observed increase in innovation?
In this paper, we provide answers to all these questions by analyzing how the timing,
quantity, and quality of patents generated by French exporters respond to demand shocks
in the export markets served by those firms; and how this response varies across firms
with different characteristics. Our primary goal in this paper is to better understand the
effect of market size on innovation, not so much exports per se; yet we use changes in
export markets as a way to identify causal effects of changes in market size on innovation.
More specifically, we merge three exhaustive firm-level datasets – patenting, produc-
tion, and customs data –, which cover the whole population of French manufacturing firms
to analyze how the access to export markets affects the quantity and quality of patents
generated by these firms. The combined use of these datasets has been made possible by
a new algorithm developed in Lequien et al. (2019) that matches a French firm’s name
with its unique administrative identifier and allows us to link the innovation activities of
a firm with the other firm data sources.
We measure innovation by the flow of priority patent applications. Priority patents
correspond to the first patent publication that describes an invention. All subsequent fil-
ings of the same intellectual property (in particular if they are filed at patent authorities
in other countries) are secondary filings. We focus on priority patents for two reasons.
First because our goal is not to measure a response in patenting but a response in innova-
tion. By focusing on priority patents, we concentrate on patents that correspond to new
inventions. Second because we want to avoid capturing the fact that firms that are more
involved in international trade are more likely to patent many secondary filings so as to
protect their invention in their sales’ destinations.
Our first finding is that on average firms respond to a positive export demand shock
by innovating more. In other words, we find a significant market size effect of export
demand shocks on French firms’ innovation. Since our specifications always control for
sector-year effects, this innovation response must be driven by differences in firm-level
innovation responses to demand shocks within each sector. This stands in sharp contrast
to the literature measuring sector-wide innovation responses – whether across sectors or
for a given sector over time.1 Our second finding is that the innovation response to a
positive export demand shock takes 3 to 5 years to materialize. In contrast, we find that
the response of sales and employment is immediate. We interpret this difference as a
1In an influential study, Acemoglu and Linn (2004) measure the sector-wide innovation response of the
pharmaceutical industry to changes in demand over time.
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confirmation that the response to export demand shocks captures a market size effect.
Our third finding is that the impact of a positive export demand shock on innovation
is entirely driven by French firms with above median productivity levels (in an initial
period prior to the demand shocks). This heterogeneous response could simply reflect the
fact that the demand shock only affects the most productive firms. We check that this is
not the case by allowing for a different impact of the export demand shocks on sales or
employment depending upon initial productivity levels. We find that in contrast to what
we observe for innovation, there is no heterogeneous response of sales or employment to
a demand shock for low versus high productivity firms.
These results provide some additional context to the recent literature documenting
the rise of superstar firms: the skewed innovation response is likely to generate further
increases in market share for the best performing firms leading to increases in market
concentration. Indeed, Autor et al. (2017) document that this growth in concentration is
most apparent in industries with above average growth in patent-intensity.
Our identification strategy relies on the construction of firm-level demand shocks that
respond to aggregate conditions in a firm’s export destinations but are independent of
firm-level decisions (including the concurrent decisions for export-market participation
and the forward looking innovation response). Following Hummels et al. (2014), this type
of export demand shock has been used extensively in the recent empirical trade literature.
It leverages detailed information on the set of products exported to specific destinations
by a firm at a prior given date (prior to any changes in innovation that we analyze in
our sample). Focusing on this export-driven measure of market size means that we are
abstracting from the potential effects of domestic market demand on firms’ innovation.
For this market, we cannot separate out the causal effects of domestic market size on
innovation from the reverse effect of innovation on domestic demand and market size.
We show that our results using this identification strategy are robust to many different
specifications including variations of the functional forms and of the measure of innovation.
We also perform placebo tests that independently confirm that our causation inference
from increases in market size to innovation are well founded.
While several stories might be entertained to explain why the effect of export on
innovation should be skewed towards more frontier firms, we show that this outcome
arises naturally from a model with endogenous innovation and markups. In this setting, a
positive export demand shock induces not only a direct market size effect – which increases
innovation for all firms – but also a competition effect. The idea is that an increase in
market size in any export destination will attract new firms into the export market as more
firms find it profitable to sell there. And indeed we find a positive correlation between
our export demand shocks and various measures of firm entry into the corresponding
destination markets. With endogenous markups (linked to endogenous price elasticities),
this competition effect associated with entry impinges disproportionately on the market
share of the less productive firms, reducing their incentives to innovate. Overall, this
combination of the direct market size effect and of its induced competition effect leads
to a skewed innovation response between more and less productive firms. Firms closest
to the technological frontier increase innovation the most, while the combined effect can
even be negative for the least productive firms.
Our analysis is most directly related with the empirical literature on market size and
innovation, starting with Acemoglu and Linn (2004). We add to this literature in three
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main respects: first, by providing evidence of a widespread (manufacturing) firm-level
market size effect that is not driven by any sector-level dynamics; second, by showing
that this market size effect is skewed and mainly driven by the most productive French
firms; third, by looking at the time dynamics of the market size effect of expanded export
markets on firm-level innovation: in particular we show that while a positive export
demand shock immediately increases the firm’s sales, the innovation response takes several
additional years to materialize in new patents. There is also a recent literature on trade
and innovation that focuses on the impact of import competition on domestic firms (see
Bloom et al., 2016; Iacovone et al., 2011; Autor et al., 2016; Bombardini et al., 2017).
These papers investigate whether import competition induces firms to more in order to
escape competition as in Aghion et al. (2005). Empirically, our work is quite distinct
as we examine the market expansion channel related to exports. Our theoretical model
therefore does not feature an escape competition channel: reductions in market share
generate reductions in innovations, though disproportionately so for low productivity
firms.
Our work is also clearly related to the theoretical literature on trade, innovation and
growth (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991a,b, Aghion and Howitt, 2009, chapter 13, and
more recently Akcigit et al., 2018)2 and the recent empirical literature on firm-level trade
and innovation. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2011) both highlighted a clear
relationship between R&D efforts and export status. Our analysis diverges from this
literature in two main respects. First, this literature focuses on the extensive margin
of export markets (i.e. whether a firm exports or not to a particular market or set of
markets) whereas we consider instead the effect of the intensive margin of exports (i.e.
of the size of export markets) on innovation.3 Second, we use innovation outcomes -
the flow of priority patent filings - instead of R&D spending as our main measure of
innovation, whereas these papers consider the causal impact of new export markets on
R&D spending.4
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data
and shows some descriptive statistics on export and innovation. Section 3 describes our
estimation methodology. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present our empirical results respectively re-
garding the effect of market size on innovation, its heterogeneous impact with productivity
and falsification tests. Section 7 develops a model of export and innovation featuring both
a direct market size and an induced competition effect, which predicts that the innovation
response to a positive export shock is skewed towards the more productive firms. Section
2Akcigit et al. (2018) develop and calibrate a new dynamic trade model where firms from different coun-
tries compete strategically for leadership in domestic import and export markets. Their model predicts
that trade openness encourages innovation in advanced sectors and discourages it in backward sectors.
Dhingra (2013) and Impullitti and Licandro (2018) also develop theoretical models with endogenous
firm innovation and endogenous competition (via endogenous markups). Dhingra (2013) focuses on the
firm-level trade-offs between innovation and product variety, whereas Impullitti and Licandro (2018)
focuses on the consequences of innovation for growth and welfare.
3Restricting attention to the extensive margin makes it somewhat more difficult to analyze the details of
how the market size channel operates: one reason being that several aspects are changing for a firm as
it makes the big step of becoming an exporter.
4In related work, Coelli et al. (2016) document the patenting response of firms in response to the Uruguay
round of tariff levels.
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2 Exporters and innovators: data and descriptive statis-
tics
In this section, we briefly present our datasets and show some descriptive evidence. Fur-
ther details about data construction can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Data sources
Our goal is to explore information on French firms’ exports to capture variations in their
market size that we can connect to innovation (patenting) outcomes. We also want to look
at how this relationship varies across firms with different levels of productivity. Toward
this goal, we build a database covering all French firms by linking export, production and
innovation data from 1994 to 2012. Our database draws from three sources: (i) French
customs, which reports yearly export flows at a very disaggregated product level (rep-
resenting over 10,000 manufacturing products) by destination; (ii) administrative fiscal
datasets (FICUS and FARE from Insee-DGFiP), which provide extensive production and
financial information for all firms operating in France; (iii) the Spring 2016 vintage of
PATSTAT patent dataset from the European Patent Office, which contains detailed infor-
mation on all patent applications from many patent offices in the world. In our analysis
we will focus on patent applications by French firms, regardless of the origin of the patent
office (see below and Appendix A for details).
Matching patents and firms: Although each French firm has a unique identifying
number (Siren) across all French databases, patent offices do not identify firms applying
for patents using this number but instead use the firm’s name. This name may sometime
carry inconsistencies from one patent to another and/or can contain typos. Various algo-
rithms have been developed to harmonize assignees’ names (see Morrison et al., 2017 for a
review) but none of those have been applied specifically to French firms. One notable ex-
ception is the rigorous matching algorithm developed in Lequien et al. (2019) to link each
patent application with the corresponding French firms’ Siren numbers, for all firms with
more than 10 employees. This new method, based on supervised learning and described in
Appendix A.4, provides significant performance improvements relative to previous meth-
ods used in the empirical patent literature: based on a verification sample similar to the
learning sample, its recall rate (share of all the true matchings that are accurate) is 86.1%
and its precision rate (share of the identified matches that are accurate) is 97.0%. This
is the matching procedure we use for our empirical analysis in this paper.
Measure of innovation: Our main measure of innovation consists of a count of priority
patent applications. This corresponds to the first patent publication that describes an
invention. All subsequent filings of the same intellectual property in other jurisdictions
(for example in order to extend the geographical coverage of the protection) are secondary
filings. We make this restriction for two reasons. First because our goal is not to measure
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a response in patenting but a response in innovation. By focusing on priority patents,
concentrate directly on patents that correspond to new inventions. Second because we
want to avoid capturing the fact that firms that are more involved in international trade
are more likely to patent many secondary filings so as to protect their invention in the
markets they export to. Priority patents correspond to 35% of the total set of patents but
95% of innovative firms (firms that hold any patent, whether a priority or a secondary
filing) in our sample hold at least one priority patent. This suggests that most of the
patents we observe in the data are successive secondary filings of the same innovation
by the same firm, and legitimate the use of priority applications as our main measure
of innovation. Appendix A provides additional details on the construction of our patent
measures. For robustness, we report all of our main results using an alternative patent
measure based on citation weights for all patent applications by a firm (citations received
within a 5 year window). Following Hall et al. (2005), this measure has been widely used
in the literature to more accurately capture the innovative relevance of patents. We have
also confirmed that our results are robust to a much wider set of patent measures in
Appendix C (see in particular Figures C1).
Capturing variations in market size: Finally, to capture variations in firms’ market
size, we use CEPII’s BACI database of bilateral trade flows at the HS6 product level
(covering more than 5,000 manufacturing products, see Gaulier and Zignago, 2010) to
construct measures of demand shocks across export destinations. These data cover the
period 1995-2012.
Sample restrictions: Although our main firm-level administrative data source is com-
prehensive, with more than 46.8 million observations spanning nearly 7.5 million differ-
ent firms from 1995 to 2012, we restrict our data sample for several reasons. First, we
restrict our attention to private business corporations (legal category 5 in the INSEE
classification). We thus drop state-owned firms, self-employed businesses, and non-profit
organizations as we focus on profit-maximizing firms. Second, we drop firms with less
than 10 employees since our matching to the patent data is substantially less complete for
those firms (as we previously described). These two restrictions substantially reduce the
number of firms in our sample. Yet, the bulk of aggregate employment (77%), sales (80%),
and exports (92%) remain in our sample. Those firms are matched with 460,000 patents
in PATSTAT, including 170,000 priority patents. Lastly, since our detailed customs trade
data only covers goods trade (and not services), we will further restrict our sample to the
manufacturing sector.5 This reduces our working sample to 66,679 firms. Nevertheless
French aggregate exports and innovation are still concentrated in manufacturing covering
55% of aggregate exports and 43% of patents. Table 1 summarizes these successive sample
restrictions and also shows the average number of firms operating in any given year of
our sample. For our manufacturing sample, we see that this represents 42,924 firms on
average per year between 1995-2012.
5Although the customs data also covers the wholesale sector, we also exclude those firms as they do not
produce the goods that they export.
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Table 1: Successive restriction of the sample
Total Firms Firms per Year Employment Sales Exports Patents
Full 7,474,147 2,597,852 100 100 100
Private business Corp. 2,888,647 1,114,651 88 90 97
More than 10 emp 400,662 260,386 77 80 92 100
Manufacturing 66,679 42,924 19 20 55 43
Notes: This Table gives the number of distinct firms and average number of firms per year as well as the share of employment, sales,
exports and patents in each sample as compared to the Full (raw) firm level dataset (in %). All columns except the first consider yearly
average over the period 1995-2012. Full correspond to our complete sample of firms based on administrative data (see Section 2). “Private
Business Corp.” corresponds to this sample restricted to firms that are in Legal category (“catégorie juridique”) number 5. “More than
10 emp” further reduces the sample to firms that are at least once over 10 employees over the period of observation. “Manufacturing”
restricts to firms that are always classified in a manufacturing sector.
The case of multinational groups: Our dataset does not allow us to properly take
into account the case of multinational groups, an issue which often arises when dealing
with national firm level data. The presence of multinational groups tends to break the
relationship between export shocks and patenting since these groups may locate their
R&D activities in different countries than the location of production. In particular, the
R&D activity for production based in France may be located elsewhere under a different
entity of a multinational’s group. In this case, we will not record the appropriate link
between the export shocks for this producer and an induced innovation (patents). This
measurement issue works against our obtained results of a positive response of patenting
to export shocks that is increasing with a firm’s proximity to its industry frontier. Thus,
we conjecture that our results would be strengthened if we had the needed information to
exclude broken production/R&D links amongst the multinational groups in our sample.
2.2 Sector breakdown and skewness
Starting from our sample of manufacturing firms from Table 1, Table 2 shows how those
firms are distributed across sectors, along with their average employment and sales per
firm over our sample period from 1995-2012 – shown as yearly averages.6 Table 2 also
shows the proportion of exporters and innovators (firms with at least one patent) in
each sector (again, averaged over our sample years) – along with the average exports per
exporter (firms with positive exports) and the average number of patents and priority
patents per innovator. We clearly see that innovators represent a small minority of man-
ufacturing firms. Only 2.7% of firms introduce any new patents in any given year (on
average). Looking across years, 9.7% of firms have at least one patent in one of those years.
This is the set of firms we will classify as innovators in our ensuing analysis. Although a
minority of firms, they nevertheless represent 37% of employment, 45% of sales, and 60%
of exports for the manufacturing sector. In Table 3, we report the same statistics for em-
ployment, sales, exports, and patents as sector-level shares. We see that priority patents
are concentrated in the computer and electronic, machinery and equipment, and motor
vehicles sectors, jointly accounting for 44.4% of the priority patents in manufacturing.
Table 2 reveals that the number of patents introduced each year by innovators can be
substantial – especially in some sectors. There is a huge amount of dispersion underlying
6Throughout, we define sectors at the 2-digit level of the European NACE rev2 classification. We also
eliminate the tobacco sector (# 12) as it only contains two firms.
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Table 2: Exports and innovation in the manufacturing sector
Mean per Mean per Mean per
Firm % Exporter % Innovator
Sector Description Firms Employment Sales Exporter Exports Innov. Patents Priority
10 Food products 6,612 49 13 25 7 0.4 5.4 2.2
11 Beverages 397 70 34 71 14 * * *
13 Textiles 1,613 42 6 63 3 2.3 3.5 1.8
14 Wearing apparel 1,579 39 5 54 3 0.5 1.8 1.4
15 Leather 491 60 8 60 5 1.0 1.7 1.1
16 Wood 1,922 30 4 41 2 0.7 1.5 1.2
17 Paper 2,385 52 11 49 5 1.6 4.7 2.0
18 Printing 1,361 26 4 26 1 0.5 3.1 1.9
19 Coke 112 338 738 71 168 7.8 57.9 17.3
20 Chemicals 978 106 37 80 18 6.0 9.9 4.1
21 Basic pharmaceutical 298 224 91 79 42 11.8 15.5 3.0
22 Rubber and plastic 2,367 78 13 64 5 5.0 5.2 2.8
23 Other non-metallic 1,615 67 14 42 5 2.7 11.3 3.3
24 Basic metals 1,125 91 24 54 17 3.0 5.2 2.1
25 Fabricated metal 7,655 34 5 39 2 1.7 3.2 1.9
26 Computer and electronic 2,318 89 18 59 11 7.6 9.0 4.6
27 Electrical equipment 527 156 33 69 17 8.6 18.0 9.2
28 Machinery and equipment 3,263 93 27 63 10 7.4 5.7 3.2
29 Motor vehicles 941 126 40 55 27 4.1 22.8 21.9
30 Other transport equipment 422 192 58 59 42 7.7 20.2 10.1
31 Furniture 985 38 5 41 1 1.1 1.9 1.5
32 Other manufacturing 1,008 47 8 54 7 4.0 19.1 9.5
33 Repair of machinery 2,952 27 3 23 1 1.0 4.0 1.9
All Manufacturing 42,924 58 14 45 8 2.7 8.0 4.1
Notes: This table presents the number of firms, average employment, sales, employment and exports (sales and exports are in million of Euros, employment in number
of employees), the share of exporters, the total number of patents and of priority patents in the sector and the share of innovators. The data presented represents the
yearly averages from 1995 to 2012. Cells with too few observations to ensure data confidentiality are replaced with ∗.
Table 3: Relative importance of each sector
NAF Description Share of total (in %)
Firms Employment Sales Exports Patents Priority
10 Food products 15.5 13.0 14.3 7.7 1.5 1.1
11 Beverages 0.9 1.1 2.2 2.5 * *
13 Textiles 3.7 2.7 1.6 2.3 1.4 1.4
14 Wearing apparel 3.6 2.4 1.2 1.4 0.1 0.2
15 Leather 1.1 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.1
16 Wood 4.5 2.3 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.3
17 Paper 5.4 4.4 3.6 3.2 1.5 1.4
18 Printing 3.3 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.3
19 Coke 0.3 1.3 8.7 5.5 4.0 2.8
20 Chemicals 2.3 4.2 6.0 8.8 6.6 4.7
21 Basic pharmaceutical 0.7 2.6 4.2 5.7 5.6 1.9
22 Rubber and plastic 5.5 7.4 5.1 4.9 6.6 7.1
23 Other non-metallic 3.8 4.3 3.6 2.3 5.1 3.1
24 Basic metals 2.6 3.8 3.8 5.9 1.8 1.4
25 Fabricated metal 18.0 10.6 5.9 4.0 4.6 5.4
26 Computer and electronic 5.3 7.7 6.1 9.1 15.2 15.1
27 Electrical equipment 1.3 3.1 2.8 4.1 7.7 8.3
28 Machinery and equipment 7.5 12.1 15.1 13.5 14.5 16.4
29 Motor vehicles 2.2 4.5 5.0 6.6 7.5 12.9
30 Other transport equipment 1.0 3.1 4.0 6.9 7.0 6.8
31 Furniture 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4
32 Other manufacturing 2.4 1.9 1.4 2.6 7.2 7.5
33 Repair of machinery 7.0 3.3 1.6 0.6 1.3 1.2
Notes: This table presents the share of value added, employment, export and patents (all patents and priority patents) accounted for
by each 2-digit manufacturing sector as well as the share of firms in each sector. Data are averaged over the period 1995-2012. Cells
with too few observations to ensure data confidentiality are replaced with ∗.
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that average number of patents. To highlight this skewness, we show the Lorenz curve for
the distribution of those patents in Figure 1, along with the Lorenz curves for exports,
sales, and employment in one of our sample years (2007). Figure 1 confirms the pre-
viously reported finding that firm-level exports are significantly more skewed than sales
and employment (e.g. see Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008 and Bernard et al., 2016): 1% of
firms account for 70% of aggregate exports in 2007, whereas the top 1% of firms based on
total size account for 51% of sales (ranked by sales) and 33% of employment (ranked by
employment). But Figure 1 also shows that patenting is even significantly more skewed
than exporting: 1% of all firms account for 91% of priority patents in 2007. (Although
we don’t show the Lorenz curve for citations, it is even more skewed than that for patent-
ing: all the 5-year citations are owned by the top 1.6% of firms). Yet, these univariate
statistics for patenting and exporting do not capture the massive overlap between these
two activities across firms – which we investigate in more detail below.
Figure 1: Lorenz curves for priority patents, exports, sales and employment
(a) Top 5 percentiles
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5
Quantile
Patents Employment Exports Sales
(b) Whole distribution
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Quantile
Patents Employment Exports Sales
Notes: Lorenz curves plot cumulative distribution function for priority patents, employment, export and sales. Data are
for manufacturing firms and for the year 2007.
2.3 The nexus between innovation and exports
Looking across our sample years (1995-2012), Table 4 reports different size-related perfor-
mance measures (averages per firm) based on their exporter and innovator classification.
As we previously discussed, we classify firms as innovators if they introduced at least one
patent during those sample years. From here on out, we classify exporters in a similar
way as a firm with positive exports in at least one of our sample years. This raises the
proportion of exporting firms to 61% of our manufacturing sample (45% of firms export
on average in any given year, c.f. Table 2). Table 4 confirms the well-documented size
differential in favor of exporters. However, several new salient features regarding innova-
tors pop-out from this table. First, innovating firms are massively concentrated among
exporters: only 5% of innovators do not report any exporting. Second, non-exporting
innovators do not look very different from non-exporting non-innovators, and the var-
ious measures of firm size (employment, sales, value-added) respectively for innovators
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Table 4: Exporters and innovators are bigger
Non-exporter Exporter Total
Non-innovator Innovator Non-innovator Innovator
Firms 13,266 173 25,045 4,440 42,924
Employment 20 19 51 215 58
Sales 4.2 2.4 10.7 62.3 14.1
Value Added 0.8 0.9 2.7 14.7 3.4
Export 0 0 2.4 20.8 3.6
Countries 0 0 4.8 17.3 4.6
Products 0 0 5.0 16.1 4.6
Notes: This table presents basic descriptive statistics across four categories of manufacturing firms whether
they innovate, export, both or none. Employment is given in full-time equivalent on average over the year and
exports, sales and value added are in thousand of euros. Countries is the number of destination countries for
exports. Employment, Sales, Value Added, Age, Exports, Countries and Patents are taken as a yearly average
over the whole period 1995-2012.
and non-innovators among non-exporters remain close to each other;7 and third, these
same measures of firm size differ markedly between innovators and non-innovators among
exporters: innovators employ on average 4.5 times more workers and produce 7-8 times
more output and value-added than non-innovating exporters. They export almost 10
times more than non-innovators and reach more than three times the number of export
destinations. These size differentials are several times larger than those between exporters
and non-exporters. In the aggregate, this small subset of innovators accounts for over half
of French manufacturing exports.
In order to compare exporters to non-exporters and innovators to non-innovators,
within specific groups, we compute export and innovation premia (in log points). Consider
first the exporter premia reported in the top panel of Table 5. These premia are generated
by regressing the performance measure of interest (listed in the rows) on our exporter
indicator – with each cell representing a separate regression. Column 1 includes no other
controls; Column 2 adds a 2-digit sector fixed effect (see Table 2); and Column 3 controls
for firm employment, in addition to the sector fixed effect. Since we are using a broad
cross-year definition for exporter status, we expect these premia to be lower than measures
based on current-year exporter status since firms who drop in and out of export markets
tend to be substantially smaller than year in year out exporters. This is the case for the
premia in column 1 compared to similar numbers reported by Bernard et al. (2016) for
U.S. firms in 2007. Yet, once we control for sectors in column 2, the reported premia
become much more similar. In particular, we find that even within sectors, exporters
are substantially larger than non-exporters. And we also find that large differences in
productivity and wages in favor of exporters persist even after further controlling for firm
employment.
In the bottom panel, we focus on the subset of exporters from the top panel, and report
7This is not the case outside of the manufacturing sector. In those other sectors, non-exporting innovators
are substantially bigger than their non-exporting and non-innovating counterparts. We conjecture that
this is driven by the fact that exporting no longer serves the same performance screening function outside
of manufacturing.
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Table 5: Export and innovation premia
Panel 1: Premium for being an exporter (among all manufacturing firms)
(1) (2) (3) Obs. Firms
log Employment 0.865 0.843 754,008 66,563
log Sales 1.361 1.344 0.463 764,372 66,601
log Wage 0.122 0.100 0.113 752,774 66,548
log Value Added per Worker 0.209 0.184 0.183 744,076 66,119
Panel 2: Premium for being an innovator (among all exporting manufacturing firms)
(1) (2) (3) Obs. Firms
log Employment 1.001 0.976 519,463 42,023
log Sales 1.270 1.239 0.205 525,674 42,042
log Wage 0.118 0.096 0.111 518,682 42,019
log Value Added per Worker 0.207 0.183 0.185 512,040 41,795
log Export Sales (Current period exporters) 2.015 1.897 0.790 346,273 41,659
Number of destination countries 12.55 11.47 6.95 530,729 42,082
Notes: This table presents results from an OLS regression of firm characteristics (rows) on a dummy variable for exporting
(upper table) or patenting (lower table) from 1994 to 2012. Column 1 uses no additional covariate, column 2 adds a 2-digit
sector fixed effect, column 3 adds a control for the log of employment to column 2. All firm characteristic variables are taken in
logs. All results are significant at the 1 percent level. Upper table uses all manufacturing firms whereas lower table focuses on
exporting manufacturing firms.
the additional premia in favor of innovators within this subset. As with the top panel,
those premia are calculated by running separate regressions on our innovator indicator.
Even within this subset of bigger and better performing firms, innovators stand out: they
are substantially bigger, more productive, and have larger total wage bill. They also
export substantially more (and to more destinations) than non-innovative exporters. All
these differences persist within sectors and controlling for firm employment.
Even these large premia do not fully reflect the concentration of innovative and ex-
porting activities within the more restricted subset of firms that are both exporters and
innovators. Figure 2 plots the share of innovating firms for each percentile of the firm
export distribution. We see that the innovative firms are highly concentrated within the
top percentiles of the export distribution. At the 80th percentile of the export distribu-
tion, 30% of the firms have some patenting experience. And the increase in the share of
innovative firms with the percentile of the export distribution is highly convex. Above
the 95th percentile of the export distribution, a majority of firms are innovators; in the
top percentile, 68% of the firms are innovators. Those firms in the top export percentile
account for 41% of the aggregate share of French patents.8
8Of course part of the relationship in Figure 2 could be driven by a scale effects: large firms tend to export
more and are more likely to innovate. When we rank firms in percentile of export intensity (instead of
absolute export) we still find a near monotonic increase in the share of innovators for export intensity
in the 5-95% range. After this threshold, the relationship becomes negative as the last 5 percentiles of
export intensity are dominated by unusual small firms that export virtually all of their sales.
11
Figure 2: The share of innovators jumps at the top of the export distribution
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Notes: Percentiles of exports are computed each year from 1995 to 2012 separately and then pooled together. For each
percentile, we compute the share of innovators. Each percentile contains the same number of firms, except for percentile 0
that contains all the firms with no export. Manufacturing firms only.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 Firm level export demand shocks
We have just documented a strong correlation between exports and innovation in the
cross-section of French manufacturing firms. However, this correlation does not say much
about the direction of causation: from innovation to exports (a major innovation leads
to growth in export demand and entry into new export markets), or from exports to
innovation. Moreover, other firm-level changes could generate concurrent changes in both
innovation and exports (for example, a new management team). Thus, to identify the
causal relationship from exports to innovation, we need to identify a source of variation
in firm exports that is exogenous to changes within the firm (and in particular to the
innovation activity of the firm). We follow Mayer et al. (2016) in building an exogenous
firm-level measure of export demand shocks.
To construct these export demand shocks, consider a French exporter f who exports
a product s to destination j at an initial date t0. Let Mj,s,t denote the aggregate import
flow in product s into country j from all countries except France at time t > t0. Mj,s,t
reflects the size of the (s, j) export market at time t. We then sum over the Mj,s,t across
destinations j and products s weighted by the relative importance of each market (s, j)
in firm f ’s exports at the initial date t0. The underlying idea is that subsequent changes
in destination j’s imports of product s from the world (excluding France) will be a good
proxy for the change in export demand faced by this firm. By excluding French exports
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to this destination, we seek to exclude sources of variation that originate in France and
may be correlated with changes for the firm.9
We then scale the weighted export demand variable by the firm’s initial export intensity
(at t0) so that our demand shock scales proportionately with a firm’s total production
(as a firm’s export intensity goes to zero, so does the impact of any export shock on total
production).
Formally, t0 is the first year with positive exports in both customs (to compute des-
tination market shares) and production data (to compute export intensity).10 Xf,j,s,t0
denotes firm f ’s export flow to market (j, s) at time t0. The export demand shock for
firm f between t and t− 1 is then constructed as:
∆Df,t =
∑
j,s
wf,j,s,t0
(
Mj,s,t −Mj,s,t−1
1
2
(Mj,s,t +Mj,s,t−1)
)
, (1)
where the weight wf,j,s,t0 ≡ (X
∗
f,t0
/S∗f,t0)(Xf,j,s,t0/Xf,t0) represents firm f ’s initial share of
sales of product s, at the HS6 level, to destination j and Xf,t0 =
∑
j,s
Xf,j,s,t0 represents
the firm’s total exports at date t0. The asterisks on firm f ’s initial export intensity
X∗f,t0/S
∗
f,t0
indicate that the underlying data for total exports X∗f,t0 and sales S
∗
f,t0
come
from the production data (as opposed to customs data which we use to calculate the
destination/product specific market shares).11
There are some clear outliers in the distribution of this demand shock ∆Df,t across
firms. They typically involve firms that export a small number of often highly specialized
products to small destinations (such as yachts to Seychelles and Maldives). In order to
deal with these outliers in a consistent way, we trim our demand shock ∆Df,t at 2.5%
(eliminating those trade shocks below/above the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles in each
year). We report our main results on the response of innovation to this trade shock using
trimming thresholds between 0-5% in Appendix C (Figures C3).
Demand shock as a shift share instrument: We note that the time variation in our
demand shock ∆Df,t only stems from the variation in the world export flowMj,s,t and not
in the firm-level weights, which are fixed at their value in the initial export period t0. We
expect that a firm’s innovation response at time t > t0 will induce changes to its pattern
of exports at time t and beyond, including both intensive margin responses (changes in
exports for a previously exported product s to a destination j) and extensive margin
responses (changes in the set of products s sold across destinations j). By fixing the
firm-level weights in the initial period t0 (including the extensive margin set of products
and destinations), we exclude this subsequent endogenous variation in exports from our
demand shock. This is quite similar to a standard shift-share or “Bartik” (Bartik, 1991)
9One potential source of endogeneity may arise in markets where a French firm has a dominant position.
We check that our results are robust to dropping firm-destination pairs whenever the firm’s market share
in the destination exceeds 10%. See Figure C2 in Appendix C.
10This year is 1994 for about half of the firms.
11Total exports reported by customs and in the production data do not always exactly match, though
they are highly correlated. One potential source of difference comes from small exports towards other
European Union countries which are not reported in customs data (see Appendix A for more details).
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setting in which aggregate shocks are combined with measures of shock exposure. In our
case the sum of exposure weights wf,j,s,t0 across (s, j)’s is different from 1 and varies across
firm. We follow Borusyak et al. (2018) who argue that in such “incomplete shift-share”
case with panel data, one needs to control for this sum interacted with a time dummy in
our regressions.
3.2 Estimation strategy
Here we spell out the baseline regression equations of French firm’s innovation on the
export demand shock variables ∆Df,t. Our identifying assumption is that after controlling
for any sector-level variation by year and firm characteristics at and prior to t0, subsequent
variations in the firm-level export demand shock are uncorrelated with firm-specific shocks
to innovation.
As we have no presumption regarding the timing of this innovation response to de-
mand shocks, we include a full set of lags and leads for the demand shock ∆Df,t in our
regressions. Our identification strategy nevertheless relies on the fact that our shock is
independent of previous innovation decisions and we will check that the response of inno-
vation to future shocks remains insignificant – in other words, no pre-trends. We restrict
our analysis to the subset of innovating firms (i.e. firms with at least one patent between
1985 and 2012), and check that entry into innovation subsequent to 1994 does not bias
our sample.12
Our main estimation strategy is described by:
∆Yf,t =
(
k∑
τ=−k′
ατ∆Df,t−τ
)
+ γ ·Zf,t0 + γ˜ ·
(
Z˜f,t0 × χt
)
+ εf,t
= α ·∆kDf,t + γ ·Zf,t0 + γ˜ ·
(
Z˜f,t0 × χt
)
+ εf,t,
(2)
where ∆Yf,t is firm f ’s outcome of interest between t and t − 1; Zf,t0 is a vector of
controls for firm f at t0; and Z˜f,t0 is a subset of that vector, which is interacted with
year interval fixed-effects χt. The second equation uses the vector notation ∆kDf,t =
[∆Df,t+k′ ,∆Df,t+k′−1, ...,∆Df,t, ...,∆Df,t−k] and α = [α−k′ , ..., αk]. As we previously dis-
cussed, we include a sector indicator and the firm’s prior export intensity (at t0) in the
subset Z˜f,t0 of Zf,t0 , so those are also interacted with the year dummies.
Our specification in first-difference eliminates any bias that would be generated by
a correlation between non time-varying firm characteristics (likely to affect current and
future innovation) and the level of the demand shock shock Df,t.
13 We additionally want
to control for a potential correlation between those firm characteristics and future changes
in the demand shock ∆Df,t. Following Blundell et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002),
12In Appendix C, Figure C4 shows that our main results are essentially unchanged when we further
restrict the sample to firms who innovated before 1994. Our sample also includes firms for which we
can define a t0, i.e. firms that exported at least once since 1994. t0 is used as a reference year and can
be any year from 1994. Figure C5 shows that our results hold if we restrict to firms for which t0 = 1994.
13As discussed in Borusyak et al. (2018), this would require a firm fixed-effect control for a specification
in levels.
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we use a control function approach based on firm performance variables measured at t0.
We use the levels and growth rates of sales and employment as controls, which we include
in the vector Zf,t0 . In addition, we include controls for the firm’s past and current rate of
innovation at t0 whenever we use an innovation measure as the dependent outcome. We
describe the functional form for those additional controls in more detail in the following
section. We note that this type of correlation between changes in the demand shock ∆Df,t
and firm characteristics is substantially less likely than a correlation with the level of the
demand shock Df,t. We have checked that there is indeed a strong correlation between
that demand shock in levels and the firm characteristics in our control function (better
performing firms tend to export to destinations with higher levels of demand). However,
there is no correlation between those variables and changes in demand ∆Df,t.
Lastly, Borusyak et al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) point out that even
when such a correlation between firm characteristics and future demand shocks remains,
the induced bias disappears as the number of shocks (our combination of destination-
product pairs) grows large.
4 Market Size and Innovation
We first show that our constructed export demand shock has a strong and contempora-
neous impact on a firm’s market size. We thus run our estimating equation (2) using
the growth rate of sales and employment as our outcome variable ∆Yf,t on the left-hand-
side. We compute the average growth rate ∆Yf,t = (Yf,t − Yf,t−1)/[.5(Yf,t + Yf,t−1)] in
the same way that we constructed the export demand shock ∆Df,t.
14 The results for
our key estimated coefficients ατ (large darker dot) and their confidence intervals (95%
as bar and 99% as dots) are represented graphically in Figure 3 for τ = −4, . . . , 5. The
ατ coefficients for τ > 0 represent a response of the outcome variable ∆Yf,t to a demand
shock ∆f,t−τ τ years earlier; and conversely the coefficients for τ < 0 represent a response
of the outcome variable to a demand shock −τ years later.15 It clearly shows a strong and
contemporaneous response in both sales and employment to the export demand shock.
As one would expect, the contemporaneous (τ = 0) employment elasticity is lower than
the one for sales; but it nevertheless becomes strongly positive (and significant beyond the
1% level) in the same time interval as the demand shock. This highlights that this shock
induces “real” growth for the firm (and that the increase in sales is not just associated with
higher prices). As is also expected given the sluggish nature of employment adjustments,
the response is longer-lasting than the one for sales and still significant one year following
the demand shock. None of the pre-trend coefficients (τ < 0) are significant except for
the response of sales one year prior to the demand shock. This is entirely explained by
the reporting lag between the booking of an order (when it shows up in the firm’s sales
14Using this average growth rate computation is important for the trade shock in order to accommodate
the substantial number of import flow changes to/from zero. It is inconsequential for our measurement
of the growth rate of sales and employment: our results are nearly identical when we compute the
growth rate using the log difference instead.
15From here on out, we set this timing window for the demand shock ∆Df,t to 4 leads and 5 lags. We
have experimented with longer and shorter windows; this does not qualitatively affect our results. See
Figures C6 for a longer window and C7 for a semi-dynamic specification without pre-trends.
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accounting data) and the delivery of the exported goods (when it shows up in the export
customs data) – that can potentially occur in different calendar years.16
Figure 3: OLS: Average response to a demand shock
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Notes: Estimators of coefficients ατ for τ = −4 . . . 5 from equation (2) are reported graphically with the growth rate of
sales (left-hand panel) and employment (right-hand panel) as the dependent variable. The x-axis represents the value of
τ , the darker dots the point estimates of ατ , the bar the 95% confidence intervals and the smaller dots the boundaries of
the 99% confidence intervals. These estimations are obtained from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at
the 2-digit sector level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Number of observations: 21,421. Time period for t: 2000-2008.
We now investigate how the firm’s innovation responds to the same export demand
shock using the same estimation strategy. One can view this as a reduced form for the
impact of market size on innovation using our export demand shock as an instrument for
market size.
We are left with a choice of functional form for a firm’s patent response ∆Yf,t between
t and t − 1. We do not think that the growth rate of a firm’s full (over time) patent
stock Pf,t would be appropriate – because this puts too much weight on patents that
may have been accumulated very far in the past and may not be relevant for more recent
patents (reflecting current innovation success). Instead of dividing the change in patent
stock ∆Pf,t — new patents introduced between t and t − 1 — by the average stock in
those 2 periods (the Davis-Haltiwanger growth rate), we directly control for the average
rate of new patent introductions ∆Pf,0 during our pre-sample time interval from 1985-
1994 (prior to t0). Given the very large dispersion across firms in new patents ∆Pf,t,
including the prevalence of zeros in many years (and for many firms, most years), we
use the functional form log(1 + ∆Pf,t) with log(1 + ∆Pf,0) in our control vector Zf,t0 for
our OLS specification (2). We also address the zeros and over-dispersion in ∆Pf,t using a
negative binomial specification where we can then use ∆Pf,t directly on the left-hand-side:
EZ [∆Pf,t] = exp
[
α ·∆kDf,t + γ ·Zf,t0 + γ˜ ·
(
Z˜f,t0 × χt
)]
, (3)
where the expectation EZ is taken conditional on Zf,t and on past and future values
of ∆Df,t. We keep the same functional form log(1 + ∆Pf,0) in Zf,t0 to control for the
16In Appendix B, we use the monthly customs export data to show that this discrepancy is explained by
shipments that arrive at the beginning of a new calendar year. It also mostly affects firms with volatile
sales: the significant pre-trend coefficient disappears when we exclude those firms with sales growth
rates above ±50%.
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average rate of new patent introductions during our pre-sample years.17 We choose a
negative binomial specification as it is best suited (especially compared to Poisson) for
the over-dispersion in the empirical distribution of new patents ∆Pf,t, which standard
deviation is 10.9, an order of magnitude higher than the 0.9 mean.
The graphical results for our OLS specification with the log(1 + ∆Pf,t) functional
form are presented in Figure 4 with the innovation response ∆Pf,t measured both as new
priority patents as well as our alternative measure based on citations received within five
years. The graphical results for our negative binomial specification (3) are presented in
Figure 5 with the same two options for the innovation response ∆Pf,t.
Figure 4: OLS: average response to a demand shock
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Notes: Estimators of coefficients ατ for τ = −4 . . . 5 from equation (2) are reported graphically. The two panels differ
in the dependent variable: the left-hand side panel considers the log of the number of new priority patents + 1 and the
right-hand side panel considers the log of the number of accumulated citations received within 5 years + 1. The x-axis
represents the value of τ , the darker dots the point estimates of ατ , the bar the 95% confidence intervals and the smaller
dots the boundaries of the 99% confidence intervals. These estimations are obtained from an OLS regression with standard
errors clustered at the 2-digit sector level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Number of observations: 22,175. Time period
for t: 2000-2008.
All four figures (across different functional form specifications and new patent mea-
sures) show a significant and sustained response of patenting activity starting 3 years
after the export shock. The pre-trends are centered around zero and do not show any
sign that the patenting activity precedes the change in export demand. We thus find a
significant aggregate market size effect of export demand shocks on French firms’ inno-
vation. Since our specifications include sector-year fixed effects, this innovation response
cannot be explained by any sector-wide innovation changes. Rather, it must be driven by
the firm-level innovation responses to demand shocks.
17This control is then defined for firms with zero new patents during some pre-sample years. We have
also experimented with using log∆Pf,0 directly in Zf,t – hence a control for ∆Pf,0 outside of the
exponential in (3) – along with an indicator variable when Pf,0 is zero. This does not qualitatively
affect our results. See Blundell et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. (2016) for a use of this type of control
function in a similar specification.
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Figure 5: Negative Binomial: average response to a demand shock
(a) Priority patents
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Citations within 5 years
-5
0
5
10
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Notes: Estimators of coefficients ατ for τ = −4 . . . 5 from equation (3) are reported graphically. The two panels differ in
the dependent variable: the left-hand side panel considers the number of new priority patents and the right-hand side panel
considers the number of accumulated citations received within 5 years. The x-axis represents the value of τ , the darker dots
the point estimates of ατ , the bar the 95% confidence intervals and the smaller dots the boundaries of the 99% confidence
intervals. These estimations are obtained from a negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered at the 2-digit
sector level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Number of observations: 22,175. Time period for t: 2000-2008.
5 Heterogeneous Impact: Distance to Frontier
We now investigate whether this innovation response varies across firms based on their
distance to their sector’s frontier. We use labor productivity (value-added per worker)
as our metric for this distance. Just as we did with the firm-level export shares, we use
the initial year t0 to generate a distance measure that does not subsequently vary over
time t > t0. We partition firms into those with productivity above their 2-digit sector
median (in year t0), af,t0 ≥ at0 (represented by indicator dummy 1
+
a ), and those with
productivity below the sector median, af,t0 < at0 (represented by indicator dummy 1
−
a ).
More specifically, we consider the following regression equation:
∆Yf,t = αH ·
(
∆kDf,t × 1
+
a
)
+αL ·
(
∆kDf,t × 1
−
a
)
+γ ·Zf,t0 + γ˜ ·
(
Z˜f,t0 × χt
)
+ εf,t. (4)
Since the firm’s initial productivity level af,t0 is now used to construct our two different
trade shocks on the right-hand-side, we add that variable to the control vectors Zf,t0 and
Z˜f,t0 . We use the same functional form ∆Yf,t = log(1 + ∆Pf,t) for our OLS specification
(adding log(1 + ∆Pf,0) to our control vector Zf,t0). And we also estimate a negative
binomial specification with the ‘untransformed’ new patent measure ∆Pf,t on the left-
hand side, along with a control for ∆Pf,0 in Zf,t0 :
EZ [∆Pf,t] = exp
[
αH · (∆kDf,t × 1
+
a ) +αL · (∆kDf,t × 1
−
a ) + γ ·Zf,t0 + γ˜ ·
(
Z˜f,t0 × χt
)]
, (5)
where the expectation EZ is again taken conditional on Zf,t and on past and future values
of ∆Df,t.
The graphical results for both our OLS and negative binomial specifications are pre-
sented in Figures 6 and 7, once again using both priority patents and the accumulated
citations as our measure of new patent activity ∆Pf,t. All four figures show a significant
and sustained response of patenting activity starting 3 years after the export shock – but
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only for firms that are initially closer to their sector’s frontier (with labor productivity
above the median level, in orange). In appendix C, we return to the full battery of ro-
bustness checks that we previously described for the analysis of the non-heterogeneous
responses. The main message from Figures 6 and 7 remain changed (See Figures C1-C7).
Figure 6: OLS: Heterogeneous response to a demand shock
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Notes: Estimators of coefficients αH,τ and αL,τ for τ = −4 . . . 5 from equation (4) are presented graphically, respectively
in orange and blue. The two panels differ in the dependent variable: the left-hand side panel considers the log of the
number of new priority patents + 1 and the right-hand side panel considers the log of the number of accumulated citations
received within 5 years + 1. The x-axis represents the value of τ , the darker dots the point estimates of ατ , the bar the 95%
confidence intervals and the smaller dots the boundaries of the 99% confidence intervals. These estimations are obtained
from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the 2-digit sector level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Number
of observations: 22,175. Time period for t: 2000-2008.
Figure 7: Negative Binomial: Heterogeneous response to a demand shock
(a) Priority Patents
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Below median productivity
Above median productivity
(b) Citations within 5 years
-10
-5
0
5
10
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Below median productivity
Above median productivity
Notes: Estimators of coefficients αH,τ and αL,τ for τ = −4 . . . 5 from equation (5) are presented graphically, respectively
in orange and blue. The two panels differ in the dependent variable: the left-hand side panel considers the number of
new priority patents and the right-hand side panel considers the number of accumulated citations received within 5 years.
The x-axis represents the value of τ , the darker dots the point estimates of ατ , the bar the 95% confidence intervals and
the smaller dots the boundaries of the 99% confidence intervals. These estimations are obtained from a negative binomial
regression with standard errors clustered at the 2-digit sector times productivity group level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Number of observations: 22,175. Time period for t: 2000-2008.
Could this heterogeneous response simply reflect the fact that the demand shock only
affects the most productive firms? To check that this is not the case, we replicate the
results shown in Figures 3a and 3b: that is, we allow for a different impact of the export
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demand shocks on sales or employment depending upon initial productivity levels. Look-
ing at Figures 8a and 8b, we see that in contrast to what we observe for innovation, there
is no heterogeneous response of sales or employment to a demand shock for low versus
high productivity firms. The responses for both sets of firms match the magnitudes of
the average response that we previously documented.18
Figure 8: Heterogeneous response to a demand shock - sales and employment
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Notes: This Figure replicates Figure 3 but allowing for heterogeneity based on the initial productivity level as described
in equation (4). Number of observations: 21,421. Time period for t: 2000-2008.
6 Falsification Tests
In order to reinforce our finding of a causal impact for market size (via our demand
shocks) on innovation by above-median productivity firms, we develop a falsification test
that highlights that those innovation responses cannot be explained by a firm-level trend:
that is, that those firms observed to increase innovation would have done so anyway
absent an increase in export demand.19 This test also provides a further check on our
control that the innovation response is not explained by a firm’s prior exposure to export
markets (since we use prior export intensity to construct our trade shocks).20 Our test
involves the construction of placebo demand shocks for each firm and then showing that
firm innovation does not respond to this placebo shock.
In our first placebo construction, we allocate products to firms randomly (based on
their empirical distribution across firms) and compute the demand shocks that each firm
would have experienced had it actually exported those products at t0. In our second
placebo construction, we instead allocate the export destinations randomly across firms
(again, based on the empirical distribution of destinations across firms).21
18As can be seen in Figure 8a, the growth rate of the sales response for the below median firms fluctuates
up and down following the trade shock. This effect is driven by firms with volatile sales: it disappears
when we exclude those firms with sales growth rates above ±50%.
19A similar approach has been implemented by Chetty et al. (2009) and Malgouyres et al. (2019).
20Our main check is to add export intensity interacted with the year fixed effects as controls.
21To be more precise, each placebo demand shock is the outcome of a random permutation across firms
from either the empirical distribution of products, or the empirical distribution of destinations.
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We construct 2000 different placebo demand shocks using both methods, and then
estimate our baseline OLS specification (4) each time with the response of priority patents
on the left-hand side. Figure 9 shows the cumulative distribution for the coefficient
αH,4 and its t-statistic for the response by firms with above-median productivity 4 years
after the shock. Against those distributions, we show (red vertical line) the coefficient
value and t-statistic for αH,4 that we reported in Figure 6a using the ‘true’ demand
shocks. We immediately see that the value and significance of the demand shock coefficient
we previously obtained are clear outliers in those distributions (well beyond the 100th
percentile for the coefficient values; and at the 98.5 and 96 percentiles for the associated
t-statistics). We can thus easily reject the hypothesis that a similar innovation response
by the above-median productivity firms would have been observed absent the impact of
the “true” demand shock. We have repeated this falsification test summing the coefficients
representing 3 to 5 years after the shock (instead of just year 4), along with its associated
t-statistic. In all those cases, our reported coefficients (and their t-statistics) are again
clear outliers in the simulated cdf: above the 95th percentile of the distribution in all
cases (and above the 100th percentile in a few). We have also repeated this exercise, with
similar results, with citations as the dependent variable.
Figure 9: OLS: Falsification Tests
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(c) Randomly Switch Products
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Notes: This figure plots the cumulative distribution of the point estimates (top panels) and the associated t-stat (bottom
panels) and for the αH,4 coefficient when equation (4) is estimated 2000 times with a placebo shock, randomly switching
the products exported at t0 (left panel) or randomly switching the export countries at t0 (right panel). αH,4 coefficient and
t-stat from Figure 6a in red line.
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7 A model
In this section, we show that our main finding of a skewed innovation response to common
demand shocks arises naturally from a model of endogenous innovation and competition
with firm heterogeneity. Our model features a “standard” market size effect that increases
innovation for all firms. But it also embodies an endogenous competition effect that dis-
courages innovation by low productivity firms. This skewed induced competition effect
captures the idea that the expanded market for exports will attract new firms into the
export market as more firms find it profitable to sell their products there; this in turn
will raise competition for exporters into that market. Due to the nature of competi-
tion between firms – featuring endogenous markups – this effect gradually dissipates as
productivity (and resulting market share) increases. This competition effect is thus more
salient for smaller French firms with initially lower productivity, as they lose market share
to larger more productive firms.
The model we present is highly parametrized. However, we show in a companion paper
(Aghion et al., 2018) that an increase in market size triggers a skewed competition effect
under more general cost (including the return to innovation) and demand conditions. In
particular, we show that the main skewness result holds for a broad class of preferences
under monopolistic competition that satisfy Marshall’s Second Law of Demand (MSLD),
i.e. lead to residual (firm-level) inverse demands that become more inelastic as consump-
tion increases. Instead, a model with monopolistic competition and CES preferences (and
hence exogenous markups) would not generate a skewed induced competition effect of
increased market size. The recent empirical trade literature provides mounting evidence
for the relevance of endogenous markups associated with MSLD demand.22
Finally, we stress that our empirical work and results in the previous sections are
not meant to specifically test whether the heterogeneous impact of increased market size
on innovation is due to the skewed competition effect with endogenous markups that
we model in this section. We are just showing that this evidence is consistent with –
and easily explained by – a competition channel highlighted by our model. Our model
also illustrates the fact that very few assumptions are needed beyond MSLD demand to
generate a skewed innovation response to increased market size.
7.1 Motivating evidence
To provide supporting evidence of an induced competition effect, a natural place to start
is to look at the correlation between a local demand shock and measures of ensuing prod-
uct entry into that destination. For this purpose, we expand our data on trade flows to
incorporate all exporters selling into a given destination. We use the same BACI database,
which reports all bilateral trade flows at a disaggregated product level (HS6). We define
the set of products sold in a destination at the most disaggregated level possible for this
22See Melitz (2018) for a summary of this evidence and how it is connected to endogenous markups and
MSLD demand. This evidence for endogenous markups adjustments would also be consistent with
oligopoly models where the elasticity of substitution between products remain constant. Such a model
would nevertheless feature endogenous price elasticities that respond in a very similar way to those in
a model of monopolistic competition with MSLD demand.
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database: the total number of HS6-exporter pairs observed selling into a destination i.
We use the HS2 product classification to further partition those products into destination-
sector pairs (i, S). For each of those 20,859 pairs and each year, we construct a demand
shock using exports from all countries excluding France, in the same way that we con-
structed the product-level demand shock in our previous analysis. We then calculate a
net entry rate for each pair and year by dividing the net change in the number of products
sold by the number of existing products.
Figure 10a shows a bin-scatter plot for this net entry rate in year t against the de-
mand shock in the same destination-sector pair (i, S) in year t − 1 (so the observations
are triplets (i, S, t) with t varying between 2000 and 2007). It clearly shows a strong
positive correlation between net product entry and demand shocks. Figure 10b repeats
this exercise absorbing a year fixed-effect. The correlation remains strong and positive.
In Appendix C (Figures C8), we report an event study regression specification for the cu-
mulative product entry response using leads and lags of the demand shock. Those figures
show a large contemporaneous and persistent jump in the number of new products in a
destination-sector pair in response to the demand shock.
Figure 10: Demand shock and net entry - Correlation
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Notes: These Figures present the correlation between net entry rate in year t and the previous year demand shock. The
level of observation is a destination-sector pair (i, S) and year t. Net entry rate is defined as the relative variation in the
number of pairs (hs6, j), where j is an exporting country and hs6 a product, that are exported to market (i, S). Left-hand
side panel does not absorb any fixed effects while right-hand side panel absorbs a year fixed effect. Data are from 2000 to
2007. Number of observations: 146,013.
7.2 Basic setup
French firms exporting to some export market destination D are competing with local
firms producing in D. We let L denote the number of consumers in that destination.
This indexes market size. These consumers have preferences over all varieties available
in D. There is a continuum of differentiated varieties indexed by i ∈ [0,M ], where M is
the measure of available products. Suppose that the demand for variety qi is generated
by a representative consumer in country D with additively separable preferences with
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sub-utility:23
u(qi) = αqi −
βq2i
2
,
where α > 0 and β > 0.
Those preferences do not differentiate between French or locally produced varieties.
Thus, the output, profit and revenues for the French exporters and local producers have
the same expression. For simplicity, we assume that both types of firms have access to
the same innovation technology, which leads to similar innovation decisions.
7.2.1 Consumer optimization
This representative consumer facing prices pi solves:
max
qi≥0
∫ M
0
u(qi)di s.t.
∫ M
0
piqidi = 1.
This yields the inverse residual demand function (per consumer):
p(qi) =
u′(qi)
λ
=
α− βqi
λ
, (6)
where λ =
∫ M
0
u′(qi)qidi > 0 is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier, also equal to the
marginal utility of income. Given the assumption of separable preferences, this marginal
utility of income λ is the unique endogenous aggregate demand shifter. Higher λ shifts all
residual demand curves downwards; we thus interpret this as an increase in competition
for a given exogenous level of market size L.
7.2.2 Firm optimization
Consider a (French or domestic) firm with marginal cost c facing competition λ. This
firm chooses the output per consumer q(c;λ) to maximize operating profits L [p(q)q − cq].
The corresponding first order condition yields
q(c;λ) =
α− cλ
2β
, (7)
so long as the firm’s cost is below α/λ; the remaining firms with higher cost do not
produce. This output choice in turn leads to the maximized profit per consumer
pi(c;λ) =
(α− cλ)2
4βλ
.
In particular, we see that both output and profit are decreasing in both firm level cost
c and the endogenous competition measure λ. More productive firms (with lower cost c)
are larger and earn higher profits than their less productive counterparts; and an increase
in competition λ lowers production levels and profits for all firms.
23As we previously discussed, our analysis can be extended to a broader class of preferences that satisfy
Marshall’s Second Law of Demand (such that residual demand becomes more inelastic as consumption
increases).
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7.2.3 Innovation choice
A firm is characterized by its baseline cost c˜. It can reduce its marginal cost of production
c below its baseline cost by investing in innovation. More formally, we assume that
c = c˜− εk,
where k is the firm’s investment in innovation and ε > 0; and we assume that the cost of
innovation is quadratic in k, equal to cIk +
1
2
cI2k
2.24
Thus a firm with baseline cost c˜ will choose its optimal R&D investment k(c˜;λ) so as
to maximize total profit:
Π(c˜, k;λ) = Lpi(c˜− εk;λ)− cIk −
1
2
cI2k
2.
The optimal R&D investment k(c˜;λ), if positive, satisfies the first order condition:
εQ(c˜, k;λ) = cI2k + cI , (FOC)
where
Q(c˜, k;λ) ≡ Lq(c˜− εk;λ) = L[α− (c˜− εk)λ]/2β
is the total firm output (across consumers) produced by a firm with baseline cost c˜ and
innovation k. We assume that the baseline cost c˜ is bounded below by c˜min such that
c˜min − εk(c˜min;λ) = 0, or equivalently
c˜min =
ε
cI2
(
εLα
2β
− cI
)
.
This in turn ensures that the post-innovation marginal cost is bounded away from zero,
even for the most productive firms.
Figure 11 depicts the optimal innovation choice at the intersection between the marginal
cost (MC, right-hand side of FOC) and the marginal benefit of innovation (MB, left-hand
side of FOC). As long as the marginal benefit is above the marginal cost of investing in
R&D, the firm wants to increase innovation, because the marginal profit made by invest-
ing one more unit of R&D exceeds its marginal cost. We assume that the second order
condition holds so that the slope of the marginal cost is strictly larger than the slope of
the marginal gain:
cI2 > ε
∂Q
∂k
=
ε2λL
2β
. (SOC)
This ensures a smooth innovation response to productivity differences.
When comparing a more productive firm (with lower baseline cost, depicted by the
blue curve) and a less productive firm (with higher baseline cost, depicted by the red
curve), we see that both firms face the same marginal cost curve and their marginal gain
24Since we only consider a single sale destination D for our firms, we are implicitly assuming that the
innovation is directed at the delivered cost to consumers in D. We should thus think of innovation as
specific to the appeal/cost trade-off to consumers in D. Our companion paper describes how our main
skewness result holds for more general functional forms for the cost and return to innovation.
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Figure 11: Optimal innovation is higher for more efficient firms
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curves have the same slope. Only the zero intercepts of the two marginal gain curves
are different: the lower c˜ firms have a higher intercept, thus a higher marginal gain, and
therefore invest more in R&D. Firms with sufficiently high baseline costs do not innovate,
as the zero intercept of their marginal gain curves falls below cI , so that even their first
innovation unit would not be worth its cost. These are firms with baseline costs above
the baseline cost of the marginal innovator, which is equal to:
ĈI =
1
λ
(
α−
2βcI
εL
)
. (8)
In the next subsection we analyze how the optimal innovation choice k(c˜;λ) responds
to a positive demand shock, i.e. to an increase in market size L.
7.3 The market size and competition effects
We first analyze the direct effect of an increase in L, holding the competition level λ
constant. At each firm’s current innovation choice k(c˜;λ), this triggers a proportional
increase in firm output, and an upward shift in the marginal benefit of innovation, inducing
all firms to increase innovation.
Figure 12 shows this innovation response for firms with different baseline costs. Both
the intercept and the slope of the marginal gain curve increase. We see how this leads
to higher innovation for all firms. Given our assumptions on the benefits and costs of
innovations, this leads to higher innovation responses for more productive firms:
∂2k
∂L∂c˜
< 0.
This increase in market size also induces some firms to begin R&D (higher ĈI , see 8).
We now consider the effect of an increase in competition λ, holding market size L
constant. At each firm’s current innovation choice k(c˜;λ), this triggers a decrease in firm
output (see equation (7)). However, unlike the case of a change in market size L, this
output response is no longer proportional across firms: high cost firms bear the brunt of
the competition increase and disproportionately lose market share. Even though all firms
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Figure 12: Direct market size effect (increase in L)
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Figure 13: Competition effect (increase in λ)
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respond by reducing innovation, this reduction in innovation is most pronounced (larger)
for those high cost firms:
∂2k
∂λ∂c˜
< 0.
This contrasts with the case of a market size decrease (leading to proportional output
decreases), which would lead to bigger innovation reductions for low cost firms instead.
In the limit for the most efficient firms (with baseline cost approaching c˜min), the negative
impact of increased competition on innovation dissipates completely (see FOC).
Figure 13 shows this innovation response for firms with different baseline costs. The
increase in competition decreases the marginal benefit of innovation, but substantially
more for the high cost firm – because the intercept decrease is larger (recall that the slope
of the marginal benefit curve does not change with the firm’s baseline cost).25 Thus, the
high cost firm’s reduction in innovation is most pronounced. The competition increase
also induces some firms to stop R&D (lower ĈI , see 8).
25The new dotted marginal benefit curve remains below the old one at least until it meets the marginal
cost curve, even though an increase in competition increases the slope of the marginal benefit curve.
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7.4 The heterogeneous innovation response to an export shock
How can our model generate the skewness we observed in firms’ innovation response
to a positive export demand shock? In the Appendix we endogenize the equilibrium
competition level λ in country D and we show that it increases with L. The intuition is
that an increase in market size L induces entry on the export market D by new firms;
this in turn increases the elasticity of the inverse demand curve faced by each French
exporter to D and an increase in λ. It then follows that an increase in market size L
will have two effects on firms’ innovation incentives: (a) a direct - positive - market size
effect, whereby the increase in L induces all firms to increase innovation; this effect was
shown above to be more positive for more frontier firms (i.e. for firms with lower initial
production cost c˜ ); (b) an induced - negative - competition effect whereby the increase
in L increases competition λ which in turns reduces firms’ innovation incentives; as we
saw above, the effect of an increase in λ on firms’ innovation is more negative for less
productive firms (i.e. for firms with higher initial production cost c˜). The overall effect of
an increase in market size L on innovation – which combines the direct market size effect
and the induced competition effect – will be unambiguously more positive for more frontier
firms; moreover, this overall effect can turn out to be negative for the least productive
firms - depending on the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect impacts. This
heterogeneous response is fully consistent with our empirical analysis: we showed that
the most productive half of the firms increase their innovation when their market size
expands, while the response for the least productive half of the firms is essentially muted.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used three exhaustive firm-level datasets covering the production,
export, and patenting activities of the French manufacturing sector to uncover a causal
impact of demand-driven changes in market size on a firm’s innovation response – in terms
of the number and quality of its new patents. To disentangle the direction of causality
between innovation and market size, we constructed a firm-level export demand shock
which responds to aggregate conditions in a firm’s export destinations but is exogenous
to firm-level decisions. We first showed that, on average, firms respond to an increase
in market size by innovating more, and that this happens three to five years after the
shock. Second, we showed that this positive impact of market size on innovation is
entirely driven by French firms with above-median initial labor productivity within their
sector. And lastly, we developed a simple theoretical model of endogenous innovation and
endogenous markups highlighting how such a skewed innovation response to increases in
market size arise naturally in such a model – with very few additional restrictions.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on innovation and market size in sev-
eral respects: To our knowledge, we are the first to identify a causal impact of firm-level
market size on innovation that is independent of any sector-level dynamics (controlling
for arbitrary sector level year-on-year changes) and widespread across the entire manu-
facturing sector. Given the detailed timing of the changes in demand, we are also able to
precisely measure the time-lag required before the ensuing patenting activity is recorded.
And lastly, we have showed that this innovation response is highly skewed and dominated
by relatively more productive firms within each sector.
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APPENDIX
A Data description
A.1 Patent data
Our first database is PATSTAT Spring 2016 which contains detailed information about
patent applications from every patent office in the world. Each patent can be exactly dated
to the day of application, which is sometimes referred to as the “filing date”.
Counting patent applications Each French firm is associated with a number of patent
applications by that firm each year (see section A.4). If the firm shares a patent with
some other firms, then we only allocate a corresponding share of this patent to the firm.
This raises the well-documented issue of truncation bias (Hall et al. (2005)). Indeed as
we come closer to the end of the sample, we observe a smaller fraction of all patents since
many of them are not yet granted.26 In addition, there is a legal obligation to wait 18
months before publication in PATSTAT. With our version of Spring 2016 this implies that
we can assume the data to be reasonably complete up to 2012. The sector-time fixed
effects also deal with the truncation bias in our regressions. An alternative solution could
be to use the year of granting instead of the year of application. However, the former
is less relevant than the latter as it is affected by administrative concerns and also by
potential lobbying activities that have little to do with the innovation itself. In order to
be as close to the time of the innovation as possible, we follow the literature and consider
the filing date. We consider every patent owned by a French firm, regardless of the patent
office that granted the patent rights. Here we need to be aware of the differences in
regulations across intellectual property offices. Some patent offices, especially those of
Japan and Korea, offer less breadth to a patent, which implies that more patents are
needed to protect a given invention than in other patent offices (see de Rassenfosse et
al., 2013). Since we only consider French firms, this would become an issue only if some
French firms patent relatively more in countries like Japan or Korea, which would induce
an upward bias in the number of patents held by those firms. However, we use a count of
priority patent applications only, which is immune to this potential bias.
Priority patent applications The fact that an inventor might want to patent its
invention in different countries (or through supranational patent offices like PCT or EPO)
makes it impossible to consider that one patent is equal to one invention. For this reason,
patents are associated with a family which gather different patents which are more or less
related to the same invention. More precisely, during a 12-month period following the
filing of an application, the applicant has the right of priority. During this period, the
applicant can file a similar patent in a different patent office and claim the priority of
26The time between patent application and patent granting is a little more than 2 years on average but
the distribution of this lag is very skewed with few patent applications still waiting for patent granting
many years after the application.
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the first application when filing this subsequent application. If the priority claim is valid,
the date of filing of the first application is considered to be the effective date of filing
for the subsequent applications. This first application corresponds to the priority patent.
All subsequent filings of the same intellectual property (in particular if they are in other
countries) are secondary filings.
Citations We also use PATSTAT information on citations received by patents owned
by French firms. Citations are often used to address the problem that all patents are
not of equal quality and that simply counting the number of patent applications provides
a noisy measure of the true innovation performance of a firm. However, the truncation
bias issue is even worse with citations than with patent count. Patents from say 2010
have less time to be cited than patents from 1980 regardless of their respective qualities.
Comparing different cohorts of patents can thus lead to misinterpreting what is reflected
by the total number of citations received by a firm. To address this problem, we consider
the number of citations received within a certain time window after the application date
(usually 3 or 5 years). Using sector times year fixed effects in the regressions also helps
to alleviate this concern.
A.2 Firm-level accounting data
Our second data source, provided by the DGFiP-Insee and called FICUS and FARE,
provides us with accounting data for French firms. The corresponding data are drawn
from compulsory reporting of firms and income statements to fiscal authorities in France.
Since every firm needs to report every year to the tax authorities, the coverage of the
data is all French firms from 1994 to 2012 with no limiting threshold in terms of firm
size or sales. This dataset provides us with information on the turnover, employment,
value-added, the four-digit sector the firm belongs to . . . This corresponds to around 47
million observations and the number of observations per year increases from 1.9m to 3.9m
over the period we consider.
The manufacturing sector is defined as category C of the first level of the NAF (Nomen-
clature d’Activités Frana¸ise), the first two digits of which are common to both NACE
(Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community) and ISIC
(International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities). Insee pro-
vides each firm with a detailed principal activity code (APE) with a top-down approach:
it identifies the 1-digit section with the largest value added. Among this section, it iden-
tifies the 2-digit division with the largest value-added share, and so on until the most
detailed 5-digit APE code (Insee, 2016). It is therefore possible that another 5-digit code
shows a larger value-added share than the APE identified, but one can be sure that the
manufacturing firms identified produce a larger value-added in the manufacturing section
than in any other 1-digit section, which is precisely what we rely on to select the sample
of most of our regressions. The 2-digit NAF sector, which we rely intensively on for our
fixed effects, then represents the most important activity among the main section of the
firm. Employment each year is measured on average within the year and may therefore
be a non-integer number.
A unique 9-digit identifier called Siren number is associated to each firm, this number
is given to the firm until it disappears and cannot be assigned to another firm in the
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future. When a firm merges with another firm, or is acquired by another firm, or makes
significant changes in its organization, this number may change over time. Hence, new
entrant Sirens in our database do not necessary correspond to new firms.
A.3 Trade data
Customs data for French firms Detailed data on French exports by product and
country of destination for each French firm are provided by the French Customs. These
are the same data as in Mayer et al. (2014) but extended to the whole 1994-2012 period.
Every firm must report its exports by destination country and by very detailed product
(at a level finer than HS6). However administrative simplifications for intra-EU trade
have been implemented since the Single Market, so that when a firm annually exports
inside the EU less than a given threshold, these intra-EU flows are not reported and
therefore not in our dataset. The threshold stood at 250 000 francs in 1993, and has been
periodically reevaluated (650 000 francs in 2001, 100 000 euros in 2002, 150 000 euros in
2006, 460 000 euros in 2011). Furthermore flows outside the EU both lower than 1 000
euros in value and 1 000 kg in weight are also excluded until 2009, but this exclusion was
deleted in 2010.
Country-product bilateral trade flows CEPII’s database BACI, based on the UN
database COMTRADE, provides bilateral trade flows in value and quantity for each pair
of countries from 1995 to 2015 at the HS6 product level, which covers more than 5,000
products.
A.4 Matching
Our paper is the first to merge those three very large - patent, administrative, and customs
- datasets covering exporting French firms. Merging administrative firm-level data from
FICUS/FARE and Customs data is fairly straightforward as a firm can be identified by
its Siren identifier in both datasets.27 Thus the main challenge is to match either of
these two datasets with PATSTAT. Indeed, PATSTAT only reports the name of the patent
applicant(s). Not only can this name be slightly different from the name reported in the
other two databases, but it may also change over time, for example because of spelling
mistakes. We thus relied on the work of Lequien et al. (2019) who developed a matching
algorithm to map patents with the corresponding French firms.
Lequien et al. (2019) proceed in three main steps to merge PATSTAT and SIRENE:
1. For each Siren number from SIRENE, find a small subset of applicant firms in
Patstat with phonetic similarities:
• perform cleaning, splitting and phonetic encoding on firms’ name in both
databases. Too common words are deleted (THE, AND, CO, FRANCAISE
. . . ).
27Although one must keep track of the different definitions of firms across these two datasets.
OA-3
• sort each name by least frequent encoding in SIRENE. The more often a word
appears in the database, the less information it can convey to identify firms.
• for each SIRENE firm, the first (ie least frequent) cleaned word of the firm’s
name is compared with every PATSTAT name. All the PATSTAT names con-
taining this word form a first subset of possible matches. Then the second word
of the firm’s name is compared with every name in this subset, reducing it fur-
ther. This procedure stops before arriving at a null subset, and yields a set of
likely PATSTAT matches for each SIRENE name. Very often this set is null
because the majority of firms do not patent. On average, this subset contains
10 applicants, reducing a lot the computationally intensive comparisons.
2. Computation of parameters on these possible matches
• Comparison of the names (raw names, and cleaned names), using Levenshtein
distances and an inclusion parameter (all the words in one name are included
in the name from the other database)
• zip code comparison (code postal)
• date comparisons (a firm cannot have patented before its creation)
3. Matching with supervised learning
• Sample from INPI (Institut National de la Propriété Intellectuelle) with 15,000
true matches between Siren number and PATSTAT person id (and in total
170,000 pairs, with the corresponding known mismatches).
• This sample is randomly split into a learning sample and a verification sample
(this procedure is repeated 10 times, and the recall and precision measures are
averaged over them, so that the choice of the sample does not alter the results).
This allows to choose the relevant variables and estimate the parameters.
• apply this model on all the possible matches identified in the previous step.
• in 90% of cases, unique matching. In the remaining 10% of cases, filter further
with a decision tree (is the date of creation of the firm lower than the first
filing of the applicant?, which couple has the minimum Levenshtein distance
between raw names, between cleaned names, is one of the names included in
the other?, which firm has the maximum number of employees?)
Based on the (rotating) verification sample taken from INPI data, the recall rate
(share of all the true matchings that are accurate) is at 86.1% and the precision rate
(share of the identified matches that are accurate) is at 97.0%.
OA-4
B Time lag in exports reporting between production
and customs data
The different timing for recording the export transaction between tax and customs au-
thorities materializes in the annual data in particular when the transaction occurs at the
end of a year t – it is recorded in the tax data for year t – but the shipment occurs at
the beginning of the following year, in which case it is recorded in the customs data in
year t + 1. Because part of the January t + 1 (customs) exports is recorded as year t
(tax) exports, a firm with larger (customs) exports in January of year t+1 is expected to
show a larger discrepancy between tax and customs exports in year t. Figure B1 reports
the bin-scatter of the ratio of customs over production exports in year t (y axis) versus
the share of January t+ 1 exports over exports in year t (both from the customs data, x
axis), absorbing firm fixed effects. It shows that when January t + 1 (customs) exports
represent a bigger share of year t (customs) exports, then the customs data falls shorter
than the production data for year t.
Figure B1: Customs/production discrepancy in year t versus t+1 January share of year
t exports
.7
.8
.9
1
1.1
−.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Notes: This Figure reports the bin-scatter of the ratio of customs over production exports for year t (y axis) against the
ratio of January t+1 exports over year t exports (both taken from customs data). Firm fixed effects are absorbed. Number
of observations: 53,287. Years: 1994-2012
We extend this analysis over the last months of year t and the first months of year
t+ 1 with the following regression:
Xf,t/X
∗
f,t =
6∑
m=−6
αm
Xf,m
Xf,t
+ µs(f,t),t + νf + εf,t (B1)
where Xf,m is (customs) exports for month m of year t+1 if m > 0, or month 12+m
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of year t if m ≤ 0. 0 corresponds to December t, 1 to January t + 1. We control for
firm fixed effects and the sector of the firm. We keep in the regression only observations
where Xf,t/X
∗
f,t ≤ 10 and where each share
Xf,m
Xf,t
≤ 1. Figure B2 reports the coefficients
αm along with their 95 and 99 confidence intervals (standard errors are clustered at the
firm level). Everything else equal, if the first months of year t+1 represent a larger share
of year t exports, then the ratio of yearly exports from customs to production data is
smaller. Conversely if the last months of year t represent a larger share of yearly exports,
then the customs yearly figure is bigger relative to the production figure.
Figure B2: Difference in reporting timing between customs and production sources
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Notes: This Figure reports the coefficients αm and corresponding 95% and 99% confidence intervals from equation (B1).
Number of observations: 58,027. Years: 1994-2012
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C Additional Empirical results
Figure C1: OLS: Other variables
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4a and 6a but using different measures of innovation as the dependent variable:
respectively counting citations received within a 3 year window, counting the number of patents among the 10% most cited
in the year and counting any patent (whether priority or secondary filing). Number of observations: 22,175.
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Figure C2: OLS: removing the markets where a French firm is a leader
(a) Priority patents
-.5
0
.5
1
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
(b) Priority patents
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Below median productivity
Above median productivity
(c) Citations within 5 years
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4 and 6 but dropping firm-destination pairs whenever the firm’s market share in
the destination exceeds 10% in the construction of the demand shock variable. Number of observations: 21,859
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Figure C3: Different trimming thresholds - OLS: Priority patents
(a) No Trimming
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(b) Trimming 1%
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(c) Trimming 2%
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(d) Trimming 3%
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(e) Trimming 4%
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(f) Trimming 5%
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figure 6a but use a different trimming of the demand shocks, respectively: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
and 5%. Number of observations: 26,954; 24,866; 23,087; 21,381; 19,828 and 18,475 respectively.
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Figure C4: OLS: Sample of firms that innovated before 1994
(a) Priority patents
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(c) Citations within 5 years
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4 and 6 but restricting to firms that innovated before 1994 (i.e. with a patent
application with filing date between 1985 and 1994). Number of observations: 6,866
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Figure C5: OLS: Sample of firms with t0 = 1994
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(d) Citations within 5 years
-2
-1
0
1
2
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Below median productivity
Above median productivity
Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4 and 6 but restricting to firms that first exported before 1994 (t0 = 1994 in
equations (2) and (4)). Number of observations: 15,742
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Figure C6: OLS: 6 lags
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4 and 6 but using 6 lags and 4 leads (therefore defining k = 6 and k′ = 4 in
equations (2) and (4)). Number of observations: 18,707
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Figure C7: OLS: no pre-trend
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Notes: These Figures replicate Figures 4 and 6 but without using any lead (therefore defining k = 5 and k′ = 0 in
equations (2) and (4)). Number of observations: 25,237
Figure C8: Demand shock and net entry - Event study - Definition 2
(a) Unweighted
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Notes: This Figure reports regression coefficients αk as well as 95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation of the
following equation:
NS,i,t =
3∑
k=−3
αkDMS,i,t+k + βXS,i,t + εS,i,t,
denoting DMS,i,t the trade shock faced by market (S, i) (a sector-destination pair, see Section 7.1) at t and NS,i,t the
cumulative net entry rate into market (S, i) at t since 2000, XS,i,t controls for (the log of) the number of products exported
to (S, i) during year t and for a country times year fixed effects. Left hand side panel does not weight the observations
while right hand side panel weights the observations by the size of the export market. Number of observations: 19,058
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D Theoretical appendix
We describe how the equilibrium competition level λ in destination D is endogenously
determined and show that λ increases with L. Although this equilibrium involves all the
firms operating in D, including both the French exporters to D along with the domestic
producers in D, we show that the equilibrium competition level λ is determined inde-
pendently of the export supply to D (which then only impacts the number of domestic
entrants and producers).
Let ΓD(c˜) denote the cumulative distribution of baseline costs c˜ among domestic pro-
ducers in D. We assume that ΓD(c˜) has support on [c˜0D,+∞) with c˜0D > c˜min. Let
FD denote the fixed production cost faced by those domestic firms in D. Since a firm’s
operating profit is monotonic in its baseline cost c˜, producing for the domestic market D
is profitable only for domestic firms with a baseline cost c˜ below a cutoff value ĈD defined
by the zero profit condition:
Π(ĈD, 0;λ) = FD, (ZCP)
where we have assumed that ĈD > ĈI so that the firm with the cutoff cost ĈD does not
innovate (and hence does not incur any innovation cost). Entry is unrestricted subject to
a sunk entry cost FED . In equilibrium, the expected profit of a prospective entrant will be
equalized with this cost, yielding the free-entry condition:∫ ĈD
c˜0D
[Π(c˜, k(c˜;λ);λ)− FD] dΓD(c˜) = F
E
D . (FE)
Proposition 1 The two conditions (ZCP) and (FE) jointly determine a unique pair
(λ, ĈD).
Proof Uniqueness: in (ĈD, λ) space, the (ZCP) condition is strictly downward-sloping
while the (FE) condition is strictly upward-sloping, ensuring uniqueness of the equilibrium
if such an equilibrium exists. More precisely: (a) an increase in competition from λ to
λ+ dλ reduces the profit of firms with baseline cost ĈD(λ), so that those firms no longer
operate; this means that ĈD(λ + dλ) < ĈD(λ), which proves that the (ZCP) curve is
strictly downward-sloping; (b) an increase in competition from λ to λ + dλ reduces the
profit of all firms (the envelope theorem ensures that at the optimal innovation level
∂Π
∂k
= 0 so that dΠ
dλ
= ∂Π
∂λ
< 0); this in turn means that ĈD has to strictly increase for the
(FE) condition to hold, which proves that the (FE) curve is strictly upward-sloping.
Existence: We show that the (FE) curve lies below the (ZCP) curve for values of ĈD
close to c˜0D, and that the (FE) curve ends up above the (ZCP) curve for high values
of ĈD. As ĈD becomes close to c˜0D, (ZCP) implies a value for λ which is positive and
bounded away from zero, whereas (FE) requires λ to become arbitrarily small, because
the integrand must go to +∞ for the integral over a very small interval to remain equal
to FED . Next, recall that the (ZCP) curve must remain below the λ =
α
ĈD
curve. Given
that α
ĈD
−→ 0 when ĈD −→ +∞, the
α
ĈD
curve must cross the (FE) curve at some point.
At this point, the (ZCP) curve lies below the (FE) curve.
For simplicity, we have abstracted from any export profits for the domestic firms. This
is inconsequential for our prediction that the equilibrium competition level λ increases
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with market size L, so long as destination D is small relative to the size of the global
export market.28
Proposition 2 An increase in market size L in D leads to an increase in competition λ.
Proof We prove this proposition by contradiction. If λ were to decrease, then the
cutoff ĈD would have to increase (see (ZCP)). Since pi(c;λ) is decreasing in λ, then
Π(c˜, k;λ) must also increase for any given innovation level k when λ decreases. Given the
optimization principle, Π(c˜, k(c˜;λ);λ) must also increase. This, together with an increase
in the cutoff ĈD, represents a violation of the (FE) condition. Thus competition λ must
increase when L increases.
28More precisely, the free entry condition can be extended to incorporate the (net) export profits Π
−D
earned in other destinations:∫ ĈD
c˜0D
[Π(c˜, k(c˜;λ);λ)− FD +Π−D(c˜, k; {λ−D})] dΓD(c˜) = F
E
D ,
where {λ
−D} denotes the vector of competition levels in countries other than D. So long as these
competition levels {λ
−D} do not respond to changes in D, the export profits shift up the marginal
benefit of innovation in (FOC) by an amount that does not depend on λ or L. This marginal benefit
curve will remain an increasing function of innovation k and will shift up with any market-wide change
in D that increases firm output Q(c˜, k;λ) at fixed innovation k.
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